Nate Ranson
SECR-6914
Response 3

“Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War”

In “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War,” Calcara et al. take a conservative, but realistic approach to the current landscape of drone utilization in war. While the authors provide both drone evangelist and drone skeptic viewpoints, they theorize a third path of “drone realism” for a specific subset of medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones. These drones are a distinct class of military-grade hardware requiring the appropriate infrastructure, knowledge, and, most importantly, money to utilize for a successful campaign. This specific subclass of drone leaves room for a broader examination of drone utility; Calcara and co-authors may be correct about this class, but the drone landscape is evolving with modern combat. Viewing drone technology as a force multiplier rather than a standalone war-winning capability offers a more accurate framework for interpreting its role in contemporary conflicts. While the authors are correct that drones, alone, may not turn the tide of a war, modern battlefields are showing evidence that drones can become ubiquitous enablers whose value comes from amplifying conventional military capabilities rather than replacing them.

The US-made MQ-9 Reaper debuted in 2001 and has logged thousands of hours of flight time across the last two-and-a-half decades. Despite its longevity, it still represents a top five exported drone, worldwide (Gunn., Slayton, 2026). Turkey's Baykar Bayraktar TB2 represents a 10-year old drone system that is, as of 2024, the world’s most-exported drone (Demirhan, 2024). This is to say that these systems have been fielded for years – or decades – and appropriate countermeasures have had time to mature through observation, espionage, or real-world trials. And still these drones continue to represent the premier echelon of their class, each costing millions of dollars per aircraft (VOA News, 2022).

These systems represent a large investment by states and their allies into their military-industrial partners. Each of these drones represents a heavy, weapons-grade tool that requires its own infrastructure, tooling, training, and expertise. These are not simple tasks and require a serious commitment from states that are invested in long term parity with the battlefield landscape. Changing course on projects like these can be an expensive task requiring both financial and political capital. As such, there needs to be good reason to make a change.

These legacy systems reflect design assumptions rooted in asymmetric conflict, particularly environments with limited adversary air defenses, where technological novelty enabled sustained operational advantage. The goals of these projects were scoped to the world at the time of conception and, as Prussian army chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke famously claimed, plans rarely survive contact with the enemy. While the MQ-9 had its first flight in 2001 and was a valuable American asset to the Global War on Terror, it was able to move with impunity through uncontested airspace. The 2026 Iranian conflict is demonstrating that, against another state power, these machines are beginning to show their age with reports claiming Iran has destroyed 20% of the United States’ pre-war stockpile. Real questions remain about how the MQ-9 platform can evolve to support modern, wartime needs for the United States and its allies (Middle East Eye, 2026). As a backdrop, this end of the drone spectrum maps to Calcara’s argument of “drone realism.” These are aging, slow-moving aircraft that are not invisible to modern air defense systems and with the acceleration of export, nor are they unique to the premier war powers. Iterating on this technology could be a multi-year process that renders billions of dollars in drones obsolete. Calcara’s model describes one end of the drone spectrum; the other end looks nothing like it.

For a MALE Wing Loong or Anka-platform drone, training is done through specialized military courses (UAS Vision, 2023). In Myanmar, being a “gamer” is all it takes to fly 3D printed first-person video (FPV) drones along the front lines of the civil war. With 3D printing allowing for rapid prototyping, drones are able to be updated for mission-specific purposes for a few dollars of plastic (Graceffo, 2025). Being able to rapidly put these drones in the hands of those on the front lines has turned into a valuable asset for symmetrical and asymmetrical forces alike. Disposable, kamikaze drones can be built by following Youtube tutorials (YouTube), or by reading through Reddit. These rapidly built, rapidly deployed drones do not need to pack the same firepower as a MALE drone because they are not the same tool.

Drones in Ukraine are being used for a variety of purposes including reconnaissance, resupply convoys in dangerous terrain, munitions drops, and kinetic anti-drone measures (Dignitas Fund, 2025). While many of these consumer, off-the-shelf (COTS) drones are susceptible to RF signal jamming (RFE/RL), the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has brought fiber optic drones to the forefront of drone warfare. These drones keep a physical link between the drone and the operator, providing a consistent, low-latency feed in an RF-polluted environment. Calcara’s “hider-finder” analysis still applies, but on an individual level instead of a state level. The ability for states to train their armies is lagging behind those individual groups that are actively engaged in day-to-day anti-drone combat (Murdoch, 2026). It would be naive to suggest FPV and fiber-optic drones can win a war at a global scale, but at the tactical level, they are unlocking capabilities for any side willing to iterate.

Drones, regardless of class, cannot win wars alone. Calcara’s call for drone realism echoes the results seen in battlefield fronts across the last decade. The conflicts Calcara examines, alongside the Myanmar civil war and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, all demonstrate the need for a physical, boots-on-the-ground army to take and hold land. Through this lens, drones should be viewed as an extension of a soldier’s toolkit. No one would claim that tanks, F18s, or M16s alone could win wars, but when used in a chorus of violence, each of these tools has a place on the battlefield. Calcara's drone realism remains useful, but modern conflicts suggest that adaptation speed and force-multiplication effects deserve equal analytical attention.

Calcara’s skepticism about the utility of drones was warranted given the combat landscape at the time. However, battlefield innovations and the speed at which teams have had to adapt have been a better indicator of success than simply having drones in the arsenal. When used as the only attack vector, drones of all sizes have obvious drawbacks and operational limitations. However, when used in the appropriate, mission-specific context, the future of combat looks to be driven less by who can use drones, and more by who can use all of the tools of war effectively. Access may be democratizing, but adaptation is the differentiator.

Bibliography

  • Calcara, A., Gilli, A., Gilli, M., Marchetti, R., & Zaccagnini, I. 2022. Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Institutional Constraints on Flying Robots. International Security, 46(4), 130-171.
  • Dignitas Fund. Drone Warfare: Top 10 Ukrainian Manufacturers in 2025. https://dignitas.fund/blog/drone-warfare-top-10-ukrainian-manufacturers-in-2025-dignitas
  • Murdoch, B. Euromaidan Press. NATO exercise reveals alliance can't survive Ukraine-style drone warfare. February 2026. https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/02/13/nato-exercise-reveals-alliance-cant-survive-ukraine-style-drone-warfare/
  • Graceffo, A. Geopolitical Monitor. An Inside View into Drone Warfare in Myanmar. February 21, 2025. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/an-inside-view-into-drone-warfare-in-myanmar/
  • Middle East Eye. Iran destroyed 20 percent of US MQ-9 Reaper drone fleet, report says. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-destroyed-20-percent-uss-mq-9-reaper-drone-fleet-report
  • Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Anti-Drone Evolution In The Ukraine War. https://www.rferl.org/a/anti-drone-evolution-ukraine-war-russia/33020303.html
  • Gunn, K., Slayton N. Task & Purpose. Air Force Reaper drone extension. March 16, 2026. https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/air-force-reaper-drone-extension/
  • Demirhan, M. TRT World. Turkey's Baykar becomes world's biggest drone exporter. December 13, 2024. https://www.trtworld.com/article/18242933
  • UAS Vision. Moroccan Air Forces Complete Training on Wing Loong II Drones. June 2023. https://www.uasvision.com/2023/06/20/moroccan-air-forces-complete-training-on-wing-loong-il-drones/
  • VOA News. Lithuanians Join Together to Buy Drone for Ukraine. 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/lithuanians-join-together-to-buy-drone-for-ukraine/6593276.html
  • YouTube. “How I Make Kamikaze Drones.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzOQ7Q_P6Ak

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